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Researchers have long used federal court data assembled by the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) and the Federal Judicial Center (FJC). The data include information about every case
filed in federal district court and every appeal filed in the twelve nonspecialized federal appellate courts.' Much research using the A 0
data spans subject matter areas, and includes articles on appeal^,^
caseloads and case-processing t i r n e ~case
, ~ outcome^,^ the relation be1 See INTEK-UNI\~ERSI-IY
CONSOKTIUM
FOR 	 POL.& SOC.RIGS., FEDERAL
C O U KCASES:
~
INTEGRATED
DATA~ A S E , 2001, ICPSR Study No. 3415 (2002) [hereinafter ICPSR
34151; INTER-UNIVEKSITY CONSOK~IUM
FOR POL. & SOC. KES., FEDERAI..
COURTCASES:
I ~ r ~ ; . c ; l wDATA
r e ~ BASE,'1 970-2000, ICPSR Study No. 8429 (2001) [hereinafter ICPSR
84291. For additional information on the federal courts' recordkeeping, see TECH.
& SUPI'OK-r
OFF.OF TI-IE U.S. CTS., ClVlL S . ~ K ~ I S . ~ REPORII.
ICAL
TKAINING
DIV.,ADMIN.
ING GUIDEUuly 1999) [hereinafter CIV.STAT.REPORTING
GUIDE](on file with auPOLICIES
AND
thors); I1 ADMIN.OFF. OF 1-1-IE U.S. CTS., GUIDETO JUDICIARY
PKO(.:EDURES,
at 11-18 to -28 (1985) (district courts) (on file with authors); 1l ADMIN.
OFF. OF THE U.S. C-rs., S-~A-~IS~IC:S
MANUAL
7-43 (1989) (courts of appeals) (on file
with authors).
2 Kg., Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: ?'he 7Xreat to
the Function of Revirrtu and the National 12aw, 82 HAKV.L. REV.542 (1969); Kevin M.
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias i n the Fe(lera1 Appellate Courts, 84
J u o l c ~ r u ~128
e 	 (2000); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Af)pealfi.om~/uryor
./u,(lge 7iial: I)</endant.s'Advantuge, 3 AM.1,.& ECON.REV.125 (2001 ) [hereinaf'ter C l e ~
lnont & Eisenberg, Defmdants' A l a n g e ] ; Kevin M . Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Plainriphobic~i n tile Appellate Courts: Civil Rigl~lsReally Do D i p Jrom Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV.947 [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintipl~obia];
Richard A. Posner, Will the Fe(lera1 C ~ I Lof~ Al~j~crals
~S
Su,mive Until 1984? A n Essay on
Delqation a d Specialization oftlteJudicial Function, 56 S. CAL.L. REV.761 (1983); Todd
E. Thompson, Increasing UniJbnnity (rnd Cnj~acityi n the Federal Af~pellr~te
System, 11 HAS
TINCS CONST.L.Q. 457, 459 (1984);Juclah 1. Labovitz, Note, 131,R anc Procedure in the
I+derul Cou,rts ofApt~e(iIr,111 U. PA. L. REV.220, 220 n.3 (1962).
3 l<.g.,David S. Clark, A(lj~~N'icutio.n
to Advzinistration: A Strrtisticr~lAnalysis ofFederal
Ilisln'ct Courts i n the Twmtietli Centz~ry,55 S. CAL.L. REV. 65 (1981); Kuo-Chang Huang,
Ma,ndatory Disclosure: A Controriersial Device with No Iyfects, 21 PACEL. REV.203, 245-68
(2000);Judith Resnik, Manw~gen'nlJ~~dges,
96 HARV.L. KEV.374, 396 n.85 (1982); Hans
Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, S1)lit 7iz'als and 7i'nze Saving: A Statistic(1.1Analysis, 76 HARV.
L. Rev. 1606 (1963).
4 I<.&, Jason Scott Johnston &Joel Waldfogel, Does l@eat Play Elicit Cooperation?
I<vi(lencefrmn Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J . LEGALSTUD.39 (2002); Daniel Kessler,
Thomas Mei tes & Geoffrey Miller, I<xplain.ing Der~iationsJrmn tile Fity-l'ercent Rule: A
STUD.233, 248-57
Multimodal Approach to the Selection ofCase.s for Litigation, 25 J . LEGAL
(1996) ; Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Jnfonnation and Divergent Expectations
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tween demographics and case outcomes,~lassactions," diversity jurisdiction,' and litigation g e n e r a l l ~ .Other
~
research using the A 0 data
covers particular subject matter areas, such as inmate cases," contract
litigation,':+
cases,") corporate litigation,' antitrust litigation,'"atent
employment litigation,I4 constitutional tort litigation,'Qnd products
Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON.451 (1998); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial nnd Plaintijf Victory, 103J. POL.ECON.229 (1995).
5 See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demogruphics: Is
There a Bronx Effect?, 80 TEX.L. REV. 1839 (2002); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL
STUD.27 (2003).
6 See Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of h n k e n s t e i n Monsters and Shining Knights:
Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem", 92 HARV.L. REV.664,691-92 (1979); Note,
Developments i n the Laru: Class Actions, 89 HAKV.L. REV.1318, 1325 n.30 (1976).
7 See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, T l ~ leiffect of Electoral Institutions on Tmt
Awards, 4 AM. L & ECON.REV.341 (2002); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Suruey and a Proposal, 91 HARV.L. REV.31 7 (1977).
8 fig., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigution halities, 88 CORNELL
L. REV.119 (2002); Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement:
A n Empirical ApProach, 71 REV. ECON.& STAT. 189 (1989) [hereinafter Fournier &
Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement]; Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, 7'he Timing of Out-ofcourt Settlements, 27 RAND J. ECON.310 (1996) [hereinafter Fournier &
Zuehlke, Out-@-Court Settlements]; Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and Don't Know ((md Think We Knoru) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
1,itigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV.4, 44 (1983); Marc Galanter, ?'he Lije and Times of the
Big Six; Or, the Federal Cou.rts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV.92 1.
9 Kg., Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL.L. REV. 837, 897, 940-65 (1984); Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV.L. REV.1555 (2003); David L. Shapiro, Fedma1
Habeas Coqus: A Study i n Masstich7uetts, 87 HAKV.L. REV.321, 332, 336 (1973);William
Bennett Turner, When Prisonms Sue: A Stuoy of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits i n the Federal
Courts, 92 ~ K VL. .REV.610 (1979); Note, State Court Withdr(~wal@mHabeas Corpus,
114 U. PA. L. REV. 1081, 1096 n.85 (1966).
10 See Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost E v q t h i n g You. May or May Not
Want To Know About Contract Litigution, 2001 WE. L. REV. 577.
11 E.g., Terence Dunworth &Joel Rogers, Co~rrratiotzsi n Court: Big Business Litiga497 (1996).
tion i n U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
12 See Note, Nolo Plens i n Antitrust Crues, 79 HARV.L. REV. 1475, 1478 & 11.25
(1966).
13 See Gai~riPrakash-Canjels, Tren,dc i n Patent Cases: 1990-2000, 41 IDEA283
(2001).
14 See Gregory Todd Jones, Note, Tesling for Stn~cturalCh(~ngei n Legal Doctrine: An,
l<rnf)iricnlDecision to Litigate l<niployment Disputes !s Decade (gter the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
18 GA. ST. U. L. REV.997 (2002).
15 E.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, 'I'he Rcality of Constitutional Tort
L. REV.641 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality];
Litigation, 72 CORNELL
Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, 1;xplainin.g Constitutional Tort Litigation: 7'he
L. REV.
Influence of the Attolnqr I;ees Stntute and the Govannlent m Dejendant, 73 CORNELL
719 (1988).
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liability cases.lVhese varied uses of the A 0 database have led to it
being called "by far the most prominent" database used by legal researchers for statistical analysis of case outcomes.17
For many years researchers relied on the data as published in the
Annual Reports of the A 0 DirectorI8 or on specific inquiries answered
by the A 0 staff. In recent years, the FJC has made the data available
in electronic form through the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research.IVhis easier access to the data, together with
increasing use of computers and sophisticated statistical software programs, forecasts even greater future use of the A 0 data.
Like many large data sets,"-he A 0 data are not completely accurate. Some reports exist relating to the A 0 data's reliability,Z1but no
systematic study of the AO's non-bankruptcy data has been published.
In the course of a substantive study of federal litigation brought by
prison and jail inmates, one of us began to investigate the nature and
16 See Theodore Eisenberg &James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV.731 (1992);James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore
Eisenberg, 7ke Quiet Revolution in Products 1,iability: A n Empirical Study of legal Change,
37 UCLA L. REV.479 (1990).
17 Frank B. Cross, ComflamtiueJudicial Databmes, 83 JUDICATURE 248, 248 (2000).
OFF.O F THE U.S. C.I.S., JUD JUDICIAL BUSINESS 

OF THE UNITED
18 See, e.g., ADMIN.
STATESCOURTS(2001) (published annually). 

19 See, e.6, ICPSR 8429, supra note 1; ICPSR 3415, supra note 1 . For a guide to
merging the Internet-available data into one large database, see Margo Schlanger,
Inmate Litigation Technical Appendix, at http://wv.law.harvard.edu/faculty/
schlanger/projects/.
20 See Utah v. Evans, 122 S. Ct. 2191,2195 (2002) (noting the existence of gaps in
the census data and of conflicts in the data); David Cantor & Lawrence E. Cohen,
Comparing Measures of Homicide Trenh: Methodological and Substantive DifSmces in the
Vital Statistics of U n i f m Crime Report Time Series (1933-1975), 9 Soc. SCI. RES. 121,
143-44 (1980) (questioning the accuracy of homicide data collected and reported by
the FBI and the National Center for Health Statistics); Michael G. Maxfield, Circumstances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27 CRIMINOLOGY
671,
675-81 (1989) (criticizing the data classification methods used in supplementary
homicide reports data).
21 See TI-IOMAS
E. WILI~C:INC.
E.I. AL.,EMPIRICAL
STUDY
OF CLASSACTIONS
I N FOUR
FEDEKAL
Cou~71.s:
REPORT.ro THE ADVISORY
COMMIITEE
RULES
DISTRICT
FINAL
ON CIVIL
197-200 (1996) (reporting inaccuracy of class action variable). See also Schlanger,
supra note 9, at 1699-1704; sources cited infra notes 46, 47, 55. On the related
&
(though separate and quite different) A 0 bankruptcy data, see DAVID
T. STANLEY
MARJORIE
GIKTI-I,
BANKRUPTCY:
PROBLEM,
PROCESS,
REFORM
170 (1971) (noting the difficulty the A 0 has in getting bankruptcy officials to submit accurate data); Jennifer
Connors Frasier, Caught in a Cycle of Neglect: The Accuracy of Rankn~ptcyStatislics, 101
COM.L.J. 307 (1996) (reporting on systematic analysis of A 0 bankruptcy statistics);
'and Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren &Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 7Re Use of Empiricalllata in Formuhtin.gB~nnkmptqPolicy, LAW 8c. CONTEMP.
PROBS., 

Spring 1987, at 195,
222-24 (criticizing the accuracy and utility of A 0 bankruptcy data). 
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rate of errors, exploiting a technological innovation in federal court
records: the availability of docket sheets over the Internet via the federal judiciary's Public Access to Court Electronic Records project
(PACER).22 This Article follows a similar method to begin more comprehensively the process of assessing the A 0 data's reliability. (Relatively little is known about the accuracy of other major law-related
data sets although it is clear that another source of information about
thousands of cases, jury verdict reporters, vary in their accuracy.)'"
In the large majority of districts,Z4PACER allows public Internetbased access to docket sheets recorded since 1993; in some districts
other case materials are also available. To test the A 0 data's reliability, we compare the characteristics of cases as coded in the A 0 data
with what we believe to be the more accurate information recorded by
clerks on individual case docket sheets, as obtained through the
PACER system.Z5 Even though the court personnel who update case
dockets are frequently the very people responsible for the A 0 data
collection (and indeed, such personnel may often fill in many, though
not all, of the A 0 variables on the basis of the docket sheet itself),26
the information on the docket sheets is likely to be more reliable because it is entered in narrative form and therefore without coding issues and as litigation events occur rather than retrospectively, and
because maintenance of dockets (unlike data entry for A 0 statistical
purposes) is a core function of court clerks' office personnel.
This study looks at two large categories of cases, torts and inmate
civil rights, and separates two aspects of case outcomes: which party
22 Schlanger, supra note 9, at 1601.
23 For discussion of verdict reporters' reliability and relevant references, see Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORN E L L L. REV. 743, 747-48, 748 11.17 (2002).
24 Of the ninety-four federal district courts, thirteen did not have Internet-accessible records at the time we gathered data for this study. They were the Southern District of New York, Eastern District of North Carolina, Western District of Kentucky,
Southern District of Indiana, Western District of Arkansas, District of Alaska, District
of Idaho, District of Montana, District of Nevada, District of New Mexico, Eastern
District of Oklahoma, District of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District for
the Virgin Islands. These districts accounted for approximately 11% of the federal
district court docket terminated in 2000. Because several of these districts have recently adopted the PACER system, the currently unavailable districts see only 6% of
the federal district court docket (again, using 2000 terminations).
25 Except with respect to some pleadings prior to the start-date of the system
(usually 1993), the PACER-available dockets are generally not summaries derived
from some other, lower-tech docketing system, but rather are simply the case dockets,
which are now maintained electronically.
26 Telephone Interview by Margo Schlanger with Virginia Hurley, Operations
Manager, U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Jan. 14, 2003).

1460

,

NOTKE DAMIS L A W KISVIEW

[VOL.

78:5

obtained judgment and the amount of the judgment when plaintiffs
prevailed. With respect to the coding for the party obtaining judgment, we find that the A 0 data are very accurate when they report a
judgment for plaintiff or defendant, except in cases in which judgment is reported for plaintiff but damages are reported as zero. As to
this anomalous category (which is far more significant in the inmate
sample than in the torts sample), defendants are frequently the actual
victors in the inmate cases. In addition, when the data report a judgment for "both" parties (a characterization that is ambiguous even as a
matter of theory), the actual victor is nearly always the plaintiff. Because such cases are quite infrequent, this conclusion is premised on
relatively few observations and merits further testing.
With respect to award amounts, we find that the unmodified A 0
data are more error prone, but that the data remain usable for many
research purposes. While they systematically overstate the mean
award, the data apparently yield a more accurate estimate as to median awards. Moreover, researchers and policymakers interested in
more precise estimates of mean and median awards have two reasonably efficient options available. First, as described below, they can exclude two easily-identified classes of awards with self-evidently suspect
values entered in the A 0 data. Second, using PACER or courthouse
records, they can ascertain the true award only in the suspect cases
without having to research the mass of cases. Either technique seems
to provide reasonable estimates of the median award. The second
technique may provide a reasonable estimate of the mean award, at
least for some case categories.
Concern about the remaining degree of error depends on the
case category being studied and on the research question being asked.
The second technique produces accurate mean and median estimates
in our torts sample. For our inmate cases, however, it proves less helpful, probably because of the small size of awards in inmate cases. Even
in inmate cases, however, the suggested techniques produce estimates
of the median award that are within a few thousand dollars of the true
award. In short, however, for researchers interested in understanding
the central tendencies of award amounts by case category, the A 0
data can provide usable information. We offer no conclusion on
whether the data can sustain more complex modeling techniques in
which damages amounts are linked to other docket and district
features."
Our conclusions differ notably from those based on the only
other published systematic inquiry into A 0 federal court data. The
27

See i n . n text accompanying notes 80-82.
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A 0 gathers bankruptcy case data using a system quite like the district
court database we discuss here. And there has been some sustained
examination of the accuracy of that bankruptcy data system-examination that concluded that the data are so "error riddeny'*"as to "impoverish the bankruptcy debate."2Y Indeed, leading empiricist
scholars in the bankruptcy field have concluded that the AO's bankruptcy "data are utterly inadequate for policy purposes."") Why, you
may wonder, the difference? The most obvious answers lie both in the
details of how the A 0 bankruptcy data differ from the A 0 district
court data, and in the need for precision. On the first issue, the bankruptcy data about which the above scholars seem especially concerned
relate to filingsrather than outcomes-in particular, the "size and nature of filed cases."" The A 0 data on such matters is entered into the
computerized data system by court personnel, but the source of the
information is the "face sheet" filed by debtors. The debtors (or their
lawyers), it turns out, very frequently misread the form or report their
assets, liabilities, or the number of their creditors incorrectly for other
reasons. These incorrect entries by individual debtors and their lawyers-non-court personnel-are reportedly the source of the bulk of
the error in the bankruptcy statistics." The A 0 district court outcome data do not suffer from a similar infirmity."Wn the second
issue-the need for precision-it may be that the kind of research for
which many scholars (including us) use the AO's district court data is
28 Frasier, supm note 21, at 308.
29 Id.
30 Sullivan et al., supra note 21, at 210.
31 Frasier, supra note 21, at 309.
32 Id. at 340-41 ("filer carelessness is the single, most important cause oJ erro~";"bankrupcty clerk transcription errors d o not significantly lower accuracy rates" though
"local data entry practices" do exacerbate the error rate in the "nature of case data.").
33 In the district court data, the case categorization similarly depends on the
choice of the filers (if they are not pro se, see tnpu notes 39-40 and accompanying
text). For some reason, however, it appears to be extremely accurate. See inpa note
41. We are, nonetheless, inclined to be quite suspicic)us of district court A 0 data that
depend too heavily on filer accuracy. We would hesitate, for example, to tnist the
"demand" variable, which purports to record the amount of money in controversy in
each case. First, the demand variable is intended to be recorded in thousands of
dollars, like the "award" variable discussed below-but even more problematically,
because plaintiffs rather than clerks fill in the amount of the demand. Our guess is
that, as with bankruptcy filings, small-money cases are frequently coded as big-money
cases as a result. See infra note 58. Second, there is no requirement that plaintiffs fill
in this variable except in diversity cases, which makes its availability in non-diversity
cases infrequent, and non-randomly so. Third, because the amount chosen has little
further bearing on the case, there is correspondingly little reason to think it has much
meaning.
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simply less demanding of precise accuracy than the kind of research
the bankruptcy scholars would like to do with the AO's bankruptcy
data. The article examining the accuracy of bankruptcy data describes 75% to 83% accuracy as "unacceptably low."34 From our perspective, even if the district court data had a similar error rate, that
description would not necessarily hold. Seventy-five percent accuracy
may be plenty accurate enough-or very far from it, depending on
how errors are distributed and the research questi,ons and design. We
discuss these matters in some depth below.
Part I of this Article reviews some strengths and weaknesses of the
A 0 data. Part I1 uses samples of tort and inmate cases to report on
the A 0 data's accuracy in reporting the party obtainingjudgment and
award levels. It then uses the information revealed about award level
accuracy to estimate award levels in employment discrimination cases.
Part I11 discusses the implications of the findings and applies the techniques developed in Part I1 to estimate the median trial award in all
large federal case categories and to suggest the magnitude of some
miscoding problems across case categories.

The A 0 database was designed not for research into civil justice,
litigation theory, or any substantive area of law but for court administration, a purpose that helps explain much of what is both good and
bad about the data.3Wourt personnel who input the data are trained
centrally by the AO; various quality assurance techniques are used to
increase consistency and decrease certain kinds of errors." Where a
variable is useful to track court workload or assign resources, it is frequently used and, we believe, probably highly reliable." Accordingly,
one strength of the A 0 data set is its completeness. Unlike any other
Frasier, supra note 21, at 340.
35 Although it is not our topic here, we, along with all of the scholars we know
who have worked with the A 0 data, could suggest a number of seemingly easy, even
trivial, changes in the way variables are gathered or coded that would make the data
set even more useful for substantive research. But even as they exist, the variables and
allowed vali~esallow a good deal of useful analysis.
36 The best guide to the A 0 system for researchers is actually a training document. See CIV.STAT.REPOK~ING
GUIDE,supra note 1. It is quite comprehensive and
explains a number of such techniques.
37 SeeJay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical fisearcl~in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX.
L. REV.2123, 2152 (2002) (noting that the A 0 gathers "data, it would seem, almost
entirely with an eye to accountability, workload analysis, and management generally,
but with little or no attention to what data would be useful to policymakers or
scholars").
34
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data set covering the federal courts, it purports to cover every case
filed. And it seems more than likely that this is indeed its coverage.
Cases get entered into the database on filing, and there is a built-in
check because they get entered again, on termination.
Moreover, the most basic code for researchers' use of the A 0
data-the case category, which identifies cases as pertaining to a specified subject matter-appears, from the limited research already done,
to be highly accurate. (This too is unsurprising, because the A 0 depends on the accuracy of reports on filings by case category code to
allocate resources among
For cases with counseled plaintiffs, the case category in the data set is generally based on the JS-44
Civil Cover Sheet, which plaintiffs' lawyers are required to fill out simultaneously with filings." The lawyers check off a simple description of the type of case (unlike in the bankruptcy face-sheet discussed
above, which requires filers to complete the more complicated-and
error prone-tasks of filling in amounts and summarizing various features of their cases). Pro se plaintiffs do not typically complete the
civil cover sheet, and so in pro se cases usually the court clerks seem to
fill in this variable based on their own understanding of a case's subject matter.40 In any event, we are confident that the case codes used
for tort and inmate cases are not terribly overinclusive, because the
dockets we examined for this project would have evidenced any such
errors (subject matter errors were indeed apparent, but in very small
number^).^' Because we did not audit dockets that were not classified
by the A 0 data as inmate cases or tort cases, we could not, however,
detect underinclusiveness in those ~ategories.~'Nonetheless, for researchers seeking to identify all federal district court cases in a certain
subject matter category, it is clear that the A 0 database is the easiest,
and perhaps the most reliable, method of doing so, provided that the
38 See Federal Judicial Center, New Case Weights for Computing Each District's
Weighted Filings per Judgeship (1994) (memorandum on file with the authors) (setting out results of comprehensive "district court time study" used to calculate workload measures for district courts based on substantive case categories).
39 SeeJS-44 Civil Cover Sheet, available at http://~vww.uscourts.gov/forms/JS044.
pdf.
40 E.g., Telephone Interview with Virginia Hurley, szrpa note 26.
41 Of the 176 cases in our inmate samples, two (1.1 5%) were not in fdct inmate
cases; we did not formally audit this aspect of the tort sample, but we did not notice
any errors and believe that the error rate is extremely low.
42 Underinclusiveness was, however, a correspondingly small problem in one
field study in which researchers read every filed complaint in one district court during
the study's time period and found only a very few civil rights cases not so characterized in the A 0 data set. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal I;bundations and
a n Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL
L. REV. 482, 524, 535 n.237 (1982).
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subject matter of interest matches one or a group of the A 0 case
~ategories.~.?
The A 0 data include only a fairly small number of other variables, each with a limited set of permitted values. They identify the
case-district, office, docket number, parties. They specify the case's
timing-filing date and termination date. They elaborate its procedural history, including its "source" (e.g., original filing, inter-district
transfer, remand), jurisdictional basis (e.g., federal government defendant, federal question, or diversity), procedural progress (the
point in the litigation life cycle at which the case was terminated).
And they set out the outcome-the nature of the judgment (e.g.,
money, costs, injunction), the type of disposition (e.g., by settlement,
dismissal, jury verdict); the victor (plaintiff, defendant, or both), and
the amount of any damages awarded. In the past few years, new variables have addressed whether the parties have counsel and the use of
magistrate judges and court-annexed arbitration. As in any large and
longstanding database, a number of the variables have quirks; careful
use of the available documentation is essential.44
Overall, both field studies and other data sets confirm the general
picture of district court litigation suggested by the A 0 data, although
as already described, bankruptcy scholars have questioned the AO's
bankruptcy data's reliability,45and some aspects of the district court
data have also been challenged."For example, a field study comparing the characteristics of litigation as suggested by the A 0 data with
the characteristics suggested by case-by-case inspection of records in
courthouses confirmed findings based on A 0 data that constitutional
43 Searching for cases on a given subject-matter seems likely to be more rather
than less error-prone than the A 0 database, which uses the expertise of litigants and
court clerks to classify cases. A study of civil rights cases filed in one district court.
found that analysis of indiviclual complaints by hand-searching for them in courthouse records missecl approximately 20% of civil rights cases properly identified in
the A 0 data as civil rights cases. Id.
44 The most comprehensive codebooks are available as Parts 94 and 57 of ICPSR
8429, suj~rnnote 1. Sed also id pt. 117; Schlanger, s u j ~ mnote 9, at 1699-1704.
45 See supra notes 21, 28-34 and accompanying text.
46 In particular, the class action variable is authoritatively reported to have been
ET AL., SU$M
quite unreliable, at least for a substantial period of time. See WIL.LGING
note 21, at 197-200. In addition, Kimberly Moore has questioned the usefulness and
reliability of the A 0 data in patent cases. See Kimberly A. Moore, Jzt(Ig~,Juries, and
Patent Cases-An I:'n2pin'cal Peek Inside tire Black Box, 99 Mlcr-I.L. REV.365, 381 (2000)
[hereinal'ter Moore, judges] (discussing limitations of the A 0 data for analysis of patent cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in Arnm'ct~nCourts, 9'7 Nw. U . L. REV.(forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 37, on file with authors) (questioning reliability of A 0
"judgment-for" data in patent cases).
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tort plaintiffs fare relatively poorly at trial compared to other plaintiffs, and also obtain significantly fewer money judgments or settlem e n t ~ . ~The
'
field data also confirmed the A 0 data on amounts
awarded in the sense that both sources suggested that perceptions
about damages in constitutional tort litigation are o v e r ~ t a t e d And
.~~ a
more recent study began the process of comparing A 0 data with Internet-accessible dockets, and confirmed that much of the A 0 data is
consistent with d ~ c k e t s . ~ "
Other data sets supply additional evidence relating to the A 0
data's reliability. For example, plaintiffs' rates of prevailing at trial
appear to be quite consistent across data sets. The A 0 data suggest
that plaintiffs in medical malpractice and products liability cases have
low trial win rates relative to plaintiffs in most other classes of tort and
contract litigation." These low AOdata win rates are consistent with
win rates in studies of products liability by the RAND Institute for Civil
Justice studies of litigation, with studies of medical malpractice litigat i ~ n , ~with
'
General Accounting Office data," with the National
Center for State Courts data obtained from state court clerks' offi~es;~%ndwith jury verdict reporte~-se5+
The A 0 data's reliability for award amounts is less secure.55 It has
been thought for years that the amounts are questionable, but the
47 Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality, sui~ranote 15, at 680.
48 Id. at 684.
49 Schlanger, supm note 9, at 1699-1 704.
l
orJudge: Transcending
50 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 7 i i ( ~by,J?~q
l?mpiricism, 77 CORNELL
L. REV.1124, 1137 (1992).
MEDICAL
51 NEILVIDMAR,
MALPRACTICE
N\ID THE AMERICAN
JURY:CONFRONTING
THE MYTHSAROUT
JURY INCOMPETENCE,
DEEPPOCKETS,
A N D OUTRAGEOUS
DAMAGE
AWAKDS
39 (1995) (noting the low win rates at trial for medical malpractice cases).
OFF., PRODUCT
AND CASERESOLULIABILIIY:
VEIZI)ICTS
52 U.S. GEN.ACCOUNTING
TION I N FnrE STATES,
H.R. Doc. No. 89-99, at 24 (1989).
J. DEFRANCES
& MARIKA
F.X. LITRAS,CIVILTRIALCASESAND VER53 Kg., CAROL
Dins IN LARGE COUN-~IES,
1996, i n BUREAU
OF JUST. STXI..,BULLETIN
1 (Sept. 1999),
avnilable at l~ttp://wl~w.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf(last visited Mar. 22,
2003); CAROL
J. DEFRANC:ES
JURY
E.T AL., CNIL
CASESAND VERDICJTS
I N LARGE COUNTIES,
in BUREAU
OF JUST.%TAT.,
SPECIAL
REPORT1 Uuly 1995), available at http://~?vw.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf (Inst visited Mar. 22, 2003).
54 STEPHEN
&JOANNE
CIVII.
DANIELS
MARTIN,
JURIES AND THE POLITICS
OF REFORM
82-83 (1995). .
55 See Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostro~n& David Rottman, LitigaE L. REV.433,
tion 0ulcome.s i n State and Fe(ler(~1Courts: A Stali.~tzcdPortrait, 19 ~ W T ~ L U.
439 n.13 (1996) ("[Tlhe federal method of recording awards ]nay result in some
awards being inflated."); Moore, Judges, suprtl note 46, at 381; Schlanger, supra note 9,
at 1703; Stewart J. Schwab, Studying Lnbor Laru cmrl Human Hesoz~rcesin Rlzode Island, 7
ROGERWII-LIAMS
U. L. REV. 384, 394-95 (2002) (discussing the inaccuracy of award
data in the A 0 database).
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precise nature and extent of the likely error has not been known. Several of the problems we now explore stem from the decision, made in
an era of more expensive computer memory and storage space, to
allow only four digits to record the amount recovered in a civil action." This limitation means that the highest number that can be
entered in the A 0 database is "9999," so award amounts are supposed
to be recorded in thousands of dollars. A number of errors have resulted. First, even without any inputting mistakes, the AO's data design allows for award amounts of up to only $9,999,000. Logically, this
suggests that A 0 reports of award amounts should be understated because award amounts in excess of $9,999,000 are deflated." Cutting
the other way, towards the problem of A 0 over-statement, are the systematic errors introduced by the system of recording award amounts
in thousands of dollars. A $1000 award should be recorded as a "1" in
the AO's amount field. But court personnel might easily instead record the $1000 as "1000," which is intended by the A 0 to be interpreted as an award of $1,000,000." Moreover, the need to round
actual award figures to thousands creates imprecision, and might even
mean that small awards are omitted from the system." Finally, and
unrelated logically, the figure 9999 may also be used by court clerks in
other ways, such as to indicate missing data. (Many other A 0 vari56 ICPSR 8429,supra note 1.
57 Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality, supra note 15,at 686 nn.187-88.
58 The A 0 itself warned in 1995: "Researchers should also be aware that the requirement that the Demand and Amount Received fields be reported in thousands of
dollars is sometimes not followed correctly causing the information for those fields to
be reported inaccurately. Although the problem is known the level of inaccuracy is
undetermined." ICPSR 8429, supm note 1, pt. 94,at xxi.
59 In one place in the training manual currently used to instruct court personnel
on data entry, the A 0 directs that any award under $500 be entered as zero. CIV.
ST.4-r. REPORTING
GUIDE,supra note 1, at D:l. At the same time, however, the computer system is programmed to produce an error report whenever the "nature of
judgment" in a plaintiffs' victory is a monetary award but the award entered equals
zero. Id. at 4:4,5:l. (Error reports can be overridden, but it seems likely that clerks
avoid the error report by coding awards between $1 and $499 as 1;we have seen many
such cases, and very few, if any, coded as the AO's manual suggests.) Prior to 1987,
when the coding system was generally overhauled, the clerks apparently were instructed to code any award of less than $1000 a3 zero. See ICPSR 8429,suf)ra note 1,
pt. 94,at 62; id. pt. 57,at 49. We are not sure what the instruction was after 1987 but
before 1999. In any event, interviews together with examination of the 1993 inmate
data examined here along with a different inmate case sample, from 2000 terminations, demonstrate that court clerks have at least frequently and perhaps consistently
used "1" to indicate any damages amount from $1 to $1499 since at least 1993. See
infra Table 7; see nbo Telephone Interview with Virginia Hurley, supra note 26. To us,
this makes the most substantive sense, because for low-damage cases, what is most
important to capture is the distinction between some and no damages.
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ables use repeated 9s as special codes.)") The possible confusion generated by the four-digit limitation, together with the differing uses of
9999 in the amount field, make it difficult to know precisely what to
make of the amounts reported in the A 0 data.

To assess errors in the A 0 data set, we compare A 0 data with
what we believe to be the more reliable docket sheets maintained in
individual cases. We have not undertaken to travel to a variety of district courts and examine the actual case records (pleadings, orders,
and so on) or to discuss the cases with the parties or lawyers. Rather,
we have used PACER to gather electronic docket sheets, and our research assistants (checked by us) have entered data from the docket
sheets into a new database.61 The comparisons between the A 0 data
and the docket sheet data provide a general sense of the magnitude
and direction of the error in the A 0 data and, we hope, suggest reasonable approaches to correcting or interpreting the A 0 data.

A.

The Data

The samples used here are a bit eclectic, reflecting the current
interests of the co-authors, the availability of docket-sheet data via
PACER, and limits on time and financial resources.
We used two different samples. To construct the first sample, we
began with every tort casem terminated after trial in federal district
court between January 1 and September 30,2000." According to the
60 See, e.g., ICPSR 8429, supfa note 1, pt. 94, at 12, 108, 182; id. pt. 57, at 8, 9, 33,
41-45, 47, 50-53.
61 The initial coding of the PACER data was done by research assistants without
any access to the A 0 coding, to avoid biasing the results. For the inmate sample, one
of us reviewed each entry against the PACER dockets; for the torts sample coding and
results were reviewed in periodic meetings with our assistants.
62 The A 0 tort case categories (followed by their code values) are: Airplane Personal Injury (310); Airplane Product Liability (315); Assault, Libel, and Slander
(320);Federal Employers Liability (330);Marine Personal Injury (340);Marine Product Liability (345); Motor Vehicle (350);Motor Vehicle Product tiability (355);Other
Personal Injury (360); Workers' Comp./Industrial Accident Board (361); Personal
Injury/Medical Malpractice (362);Personal Injury/Product Liability (365);Asbestos
Personal Injury Product Liability (368);Other Fraud (370);Truth in Lending (371);
Other Personal Property Damage (380); and Property Damage Product Liability
(385). See ICPSR 8429, su,pru note 1 , pt. 93.
63 To be precise, the first sample is every tort case with a "procedural progress"
code indicating termination after a judge or jury trial, and with a specified victor,
between January 1 , 2000 and September 30, 2000. There are an additional eighty-five
cases without information as to the victor in the A 0 data set. According to their
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A 0 data, 786 such cases terminated in ninety of the ninety-four federal districts. We then excluded 105 cases in the districts that do not
participate in PACER or in which PACER-based outcomes were otherwise unavailable." The total number of cases included in panel A of
Table 1, below, is thus 681.
The second sample has two parts. The first part, described in
panel B-1 of Table 1 below, includes every available inmate civil rights
caseM terminated in federal district court in fiscal 19936Vn which a
positive plaintiffs award was recorded in the A 0 data." The A 0 recorded 142 such cases, in fifty-eight district courts; we were able to
obtain the relevant docket information for 126, from fifty-five courts.68
The sample's second part, described in panel R2 of Table 1 below,
explores an oddity in the data: the A 0 data includes 330 inmate cases
terminated in 1993 in which the .amount of the judgment is Coded as
zero but the plaintiff is nonetheless c;ded as t.he
We con"disposition" codes, these seem largely to be cases that settled or were otherwise disposed of without a verdict despite a trial having commenced or been completed. But
it is not in~plausiblethat some of them were in fact tried to final judgment but for
some reason the court clerk either did not know or failed to enter the victor. As
discussed below, we also looked at a separate sample of cases terminated between
1996 and 1999; these too were tort cases tried to judgment, but limited to diversity
cases. S P infra
~
note 78.
64 The number of cases omitted from districts not participating in PACER follows
in parentheses after the name of the applicable district: Southern District of New York
(39), Eastern District of North Carolina (3), Western District of Kentucky (9), Southern District of Indiana (3), Western District of Arkansas (6), District of Alaska ( l ) ,
District of Idaho (3), District of Montana (3), District of Nevada (4), District of New
Mexico (8), and Eastern District of Oklahoma (8). In addition, there were eighteen
cases from scattered districts for which docket information was not available or in
which we could not classify the outcome for some other reason.
65 The inmate case sample includes two A 0 inmate case categories-Prisoner
Civil Rights (550) and Prison Conditions (555). See Schlanger, supra note 9, at 16991700, for a discussion of these two categories.
66 We follow the A 0 and use the federal fiscal year, October 1, 1992 to September 30, 1993.
67 For purposes of comparing the inmate sample with the tort sample, note that
A 0 data indicates that of these 142 cases, only about half involved trials (eighty-one
are coded with dispositions by jury or judge verdict; eighty-two are coded as resolved
"during" or "after" jury or judge trials; and seventy-seven meet both criteria).
68 For the inmate sample, though not the torts sample, we made efforts to obtain
photocopied docket sheets from court clerks' offices for cases in the districts that do
not participate in PACEK. In some cases, the clerks' offices were unable to identify
the docket; in others, the records were unavailable for a variety of reasons. We were
able to obtain 129 docket sheets; in three of them, the requisite information could
not be gleaned from the docket sheet.
69 See supra note 59.
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structed a 20% random sample of these anomalous case records, attempting to obtaiq sixty-seven of them from thirty-eight district courts.
Of these, we were able to actually get docket sheets for forty-seven,
from twenty-eight courts, and to glean the relevant information from
all but six.'"
Given the nature of our samples, a cautionary note is in order.
We are reasonably confident that our results are valid for the case
categories and times we study, at least for cases terminated after trial.
Applying the findings to data sets covering different time periods, different case categories, and different procedural postures, as we ourselves do below, should be done with the samples' limitations in mind.

B.

Win Rates

Because of differences in the tort and inmate samples, we explore
accuracy in reporting judgments separately. Table 1 explores the rate
of agreement between the A 0 coding of whom judgment was entered
for and what inspection of individual docket sheets reveals.
Panel A describes the tort cases terminated in 2000 (again, cases
with AO-reported judgments after trial). Its 313 AO-coded plaintiffs'
judgments include 253 cases with AO-reported judgments for positive
amounts and sixty cases in which the judgment was reported as zero,
even though the plaintiff was reported as the victor. The seventeen
cases coded with judgments coded for "both plaintiff and defendant"
include a slightly higher proportion of awards reported as zero-six.
We include all of these zero-award cases in Table 1, but will address
them separately in analyses of award amounts.
Panel B-1 covers the 1993 inmate cases with AO-coded judgments
for positive amounts; panel B-2 covers those with judgments entered
by the A 0 as being equal to zero." Because the inmate sample was
constructed only from cases in which plaintiffs were listed as at least
70 The cases were selected using a random number generator, and we did not
resample to make up for unavailable dockets. The poor retrieval rate is not surprising
because the distribution of anomalous dockets across districts is extremely disproportionate; with a very large number (24%) from districts that did not participate in
PACER, even though those districts accounted for a much smaller proportion (11%)
of the inmate docket terminated in 1993. The Southern District of New York, in
particular, reported forty-five of these cases in 1993 (about 14% of the total amount,
though the district had less than 3% of inmate terminations that year) and is the
source of much of the anomaly.
71 The last comprehensive codebook about the database, published in 1997, explains that a value of zero means "missing," ICPSR 8429, supra note 1, pt. 94, at 62,
though this comment is not repeated in the more recent codebooks or in the training
materials currently used by court clerks. See supra note 59.
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partial victors, cases reporting judgments for defendants are not included. In addition, the panel B-2 data are drawn from samples. The
column reporting judgments for plaintiffs is a sample of thirty (of
185) 1993 inmate trials with judgments for plaintiffs and zero-awards.
The column reporting judgments for both is a sample of eleven of 145
cases from 1993 inmate trials with judgments for both and zeroawards.
Each panel shows all the sampled permutations of outcomes,
where the A 0 records a victory for plaintiff, defendant, or both, and
the PACER-obtained docket can be classified as for plaintiff or defendant. The shaded squares are those in which our two sources unambiguously agree.

PANEL A-All

available tort trials terminated in 2000 ( n = 681)
A 0 Judgment for-n (% of cases)

PACER judgment for:
Plaintiff
Defendant
PANEL B-1-All

Plaintiff

Defendant

"Both"

313 (46.0%)

10 (1.5%)

17 (2.5%)

3 (0.4%)

337 (49.5%)

1 (0.1%)

available inmate cases terminated in fiscal year 1993,
A 0 Award > 0 ( n = 126)
A 0 Judgment for-n (% of cases)

PACER judgment for:
Plain tiff
Defendant
PANEL B-2-Sample

PACER judgment for:

Plaintiff

Defendant

"Both"

98- ..(77.8%)
. --

-

24 (19.0%)
0

4 (3.2%)

of inmate cases terminated in fiscal year 1993,
A 0 Award = 0 ( n = 41)
A 0 Judgment for-n (% of cases)
Plaintiff

Defendant

"Both"

Plain tiff

5 (12.2%)

-

2 (4.9%)

Defendant (includes
voluntary dismissals)

25 (61.0%)

-

9 (22.0%)

SOURC:E:
ICPSR 8429, suprn note 1, supplemented by PACER docket research. The
columns show who won according to the A 0 data; the tows show who won
according to the Inore accurate Internet-available docket sheets. Shaded squares
are unambiguously in agreement.

For the cases in panels A and B-1, the A 0 data prove extremely
accurate. In panel A, there is agreement with the PACER-based data
in about 95% of the cases. More than half of the errors, if they are
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properly even considered errors, arise from the small portion of the
docket in which the A 0 "judgment for" variable is coded "both,"
meaning that judgment was entered for both plaintiff and defendant.
Such cases amount to 2.5% of tort trial verdicts in 2000 (or about 5%
of the tort cases with a full or partial plaintiffs' victory coded). The
portion of the sample in which victory is recorded for the plaintiff but
the amount of damages is coded zero do not present a different error
pattern. The chart does not separate such cases out-but of the sixty,
just one (1.6%) has an incorrect "judgment-for" code. In panel B-1,
judgments coded by the A 0 as simple plaintiffs' victories are similarly
accurate. Nearly all the arguable errors are from the "judgment for"
equals "both" category, which forms a far larger proportion of the inmate sample than of the torts sample7'--19% of the inmate cases with
full or partial plaintiffs' victory coded. As in panel A, our reading of
case dockets in cases so coded in the A 0 data set cannot distinguish
them from the plain vanilla plaintiffs' j ~ d g m e n t s . ~ "
We consider the errors in the "judgment for both" category unsurprising, because the intended meaning of "both" is unclear. The
A 0 apparently does not provide any guidance to court personnel on
this point.74 Judgment for "both" could mean simply that at least one
defendant beat liability on at least one count of the complaint. But in
that case, one would expect a far higher percentage of cases to be so
coded; it simply cannot be the case that victorious plaintiffs win a victory on all counts against all defendants in all but 5% of their judgments. So if this is the intent, then "judgment for both" is being used
far too little. Alternative interpretations of "judgment for both" are
possible-for example, the category would make some sense if applied to the small group of cases in which defendants bring counterclaims and both the defendant and the plaintiff win on liability. Or
the code might signal the presence of a pyrrhic plaintiffs victory-a
case in which the plaintiff technically wins but is awarded only nominal damages, or some similar outcome. There is, however, little sign
72 The twenty-four such cases comprise about 2% of all inmate trial judgments;
defendants won 900 of the trial judgments in inmate cases terminated in 1993.
73 Of the seventeen tort cases in 2000 coded as judgment for both, twelve were in
the Fifth Circuit. Of the twenty-six sin~ilarlycoded inmate cases, twelve were in the
Eighth Circuit. We have no particular reason to think that this is anything other than
random variation because when we looked at the entire A 0 data set of judgments
from 1987 (when the A 0 began using the current coding system) to 2000, we found
that the only notable outlier in the use of the "both" code was the Ninth Circuit, in
which district courts disposed of 16% of the cases, but codcd 32% of the "boths."
74 See CIV.STAT. REPORTING
G UIDE,
supra note 1, at 3:21, D:2 (indicating the code
for "both plaintiff and defendant" with no further explanation).
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in the dockets that any such guess actually matches how the code is
being used. We are, in short, unable to come up with any consistent
interpretation of its meaning. In the absence of a theory for what
"both" should mean, it is hard to say that any use of it is erroneous.
Still, researchers would be well advised to consider counting cases in
which "judgment for" equals "both" as plaintiffs' victories, which is
how nearly all appear to us.
Panel B-2 presents a far less favorable view of the accuracy of the
A 0 data. Unlike the results in the torts sample, for inmate cases, in
the anomalous category of purported plaintifL5' victories with zero (or
missing)75damages, the AO's "judgment for" data seem to be too error-ridden to be of use. Further exploration is clearly required; we
offer some preliminary thoughts here. First, in both tort and inmate
cases, and over the federal docket taken as a whole, the problematic
coding (that is, the conjunction of judgment for plaintiff and a zeroaward) seems to be considerably more common in cases terminated
without trials than in those terminated after trial.7"esearchers
looking at trial judgments have somewhat less to be worried about than
those looking at overall, or just non-trial, outcomes. (Among the portion of the anomalous cases that had trials, however, the problem remains; of the forty-one cases in Panel B-1, eleven are coded by the A 0
as involving trials, of which seven have incorrect "judgment for"
codes.) Second, the AO's coding in these anomalous cases seems to
be erroneous in different ways in our two samples. In the torts sample, as already stated, there is no problem in the "judgment for" variable. Nonetheless, the anomaly does flag somewhat consistent error.
As Table 2 demonstrates, that error lies in the "award" variable, which
is correctly coded in only about half of the sixty cases we were able to
check. (In half the cases, that is, the plaintiff really did win, and without any damages-these are declaratory judgment cases; in the other
half, the plaintiff won damages incorrectly coded as not present.) In
the inmate sample, the error lies in the "judgment for" variable. It
may be, however, that inmate cases, with their extremely low rate of
success for plaintiffs, are exceptional in this respect. Because of the
varying relation between zero-award cases and error patterns, we report in Part I11 the percentage for each major case category of plaintiffs' awards for an amount of zero.77
--

75 See supru note 59.
76 In all fiscal year 2000 terminations, for example, the anomalous coding was
present in 27% of cases ended after trial and 37% of other cases in which the A 0 data
includes ':judgment-for" values.
77 See infra Part 111, tb1.9.
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The particular lesson we draw is that the A 0 "judgment for" variable is reliably accurate except where something else looks suspicious-such as, for example, what looks like a large proportion of
take-nothing plaintiffs' judgments.'* The more general lesson is one
of cautious optimism. The A 0 data contain their own error checks;
different variables can be exanlined in relation to each other to assess
the likelihood of error. So far as we have been able to determine,
where the values make sense and seem consistent across variables, the
data are very good indeed. But where there seems to be an anomaly,
researchers would be foolhardy not to inquire further. And the availability of PACER dockets allows such inquiry with relative economy.

C. Awards
This section first discusses the accuracy of the A 0 reports of
awards following trials in tort cases and in inmate cases. It then devotes separate attention to the import of these errors, looking at
award means and medians within our samples. Finally, it applies the
techniques developed in assessing tort and inmate case reliability to
estimate awards in employment discrimination cases.
1. The Frequency and Nature of Errors in Award Amounts

Table 2 reports on error rates in the AO-reported awards in our
2000 tort sample, as checked against dockets available from PACER.
Different error rates and types are associated with different awards,
and (as will become evident in the discussion of inmate cases below)
these associations may vary with the kind of case.
The table summarizes errors in columns, by error type. Its fourth
colunln shows that, in our tort trial sample, a plurality of classifiable
errors relates to rounding. These can be simple arithmetic mistakes;
where an award is rounded up instead of down, for example. Other
times rounding errors exist when clerk's office personnel seem to use
less precision than the system allows; where, for example, a damages

-

78 We repeated the same analysis on a smaller sample of tort cases terminated
from 1996 to 1999. Although these were a nonrandom set of cases (limited to districts in the First, Second, and Third Circuits and with different proportions of the
trial sample for different years), the 1996-1999 data allow for a partial check on the
results reported in the text. Our results for the second sample strongly confirm our
finding of a very high level of accuracy for the AO's "judgment for" variable.
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A 0 award
range
(in 1000s) Total n

0
1
2-199
200-9998
9999
TOTAL
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61
2
130
90
24
307

Type of error-n
Errors
n (% o f sample)

31
0
38
37
19
125

(51%)
(0%)
(29%)
(41%)
(79%)
(41%)

Rounding

1
0
19
13
0

(3%)
(0%)
(50%)
(35%)
(0%)

(% o f errors)

Digit

0
0
1
2
0

(0%)
(0%)
(3%)
(5%)
(0%)

Other

30 (97%)
0 (0%)
14 (37%)
31 (84%)
19 (100%)

33 (26%) 3 (2%) 94 (76%)

SOURCE:
ICPSK 8429, supra note 1 , supplemented by PACER docket research. The
rows group cases by the damages award recorded in the A 0 data set. The columns
su~nmarizethe rate and accuracy of the A 0 coding.

award of $357,914 is coded as 360 (which should mean an award between $359,500 and $360,499). While the amounts subject to rounding error can be several thousand dollars or more, these are not errors
that should greatly concern most analysts, because they are necessarily
either small or small in relation to the actual award, and usually both.
Digit errors, which we define to occur where an award is misstated in
the A 0 data because of the need to input the amount in thousands of
dollars, could pose a larger problem for research use of the A 0 data,
but such errors are very rare in our tort trial sample. The final column aggregates a variety of other kinds of errors: typos, partial
awards, and so on. Some may well not be errors at all, but rather
disagreements between the two data sources about the proper way to
categorize different kinds of awards (e.g., prejudgment interest,
costs).
As discussed above, awards coded by the A 0 as zero in which
plaintiffs are simultaneously coded as victors merit special mention.
The dockets set out the amount of the judgment in sixty-one of the
seventy-seven such cases. Table 2 shows that half of those awards were
correctly coded; they were nearly all declaratory j ~ d g m e n t s .The
~~
79 The cases included meet the following criteria: They are coded by the A 0 as
terminating after a trial, with a judgment for plaintiff or for both, and we were able to
obtain actual award information for them. Additional award errors, not presented in
Table 2, stem from errors in the "judgment for" code-of the ten cases identified in
Table 1's panel A as erroneously coded by the A 0 as defendants' victories, eight
conlpounded the error with awards recorded as zero.
80 Twenty-nine of the thirty were in related cases in which an insurance conlpany
apparently successfully sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants did not
have asbestosis. See, e.g, Liberty Mut. Ins. Go. v. Carr, No. 97-125 (E.D. Tenn. filed
Mar. 12, 1997); L.iberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Seabolt, No. 97-105 (E.D. Tenn. filed Mar. 12,
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other half, incorrectly coded, consists of ordinary damage awards for
plaintiffs, in varying (non-zero) amounts. (In addition, one of these
cases was actually a defendant's victory.)
Finally, the cases in which the award is coded 9999 prove to be of
two types. As intended by the AO, in a portion of our sample (five of
twenty-four cases), 9999 indicates awards of $9.999 million or more.
But the large majority are not cases in which the award is too high for
proper coding in the A 0 system, but are rather errors.
Similar analysis can be applied to the sample of inmate cases
from 1993, though the results are quite different. Table 3 groups the
inmate cases by A 0 award range.

A 0 award
range
(in 1000s) Total n
1
52
2-999
48
1000-9998
17
9999
5
TOTAL
122

Type of error-n
Errors n
(% of sample)
1 (2%p2
13 (27%)
16 (94%)83
5 (100%)
35 (29%)

Rounding
1 (8%)
1 (6%)
2 (6%)

Digit
0
8
10
0
18

(% of errors)
Other

(0%)
1
(62%) 4
(63%) 5
(0%)
5
(51%) 15

(100%)
(31%)
(31%)
(100%)
(43%)

SOURCE: ICPSR 8429, supra note 1, supplemented by docket research. The rows
group cases by the damages award recorded in the A 0 data set. The columns
summarize the rate and accuracy of the A 0 coding.

As for Table 2's tort sample, the errors in the inmate case sample
are summarized in columns by error type. One thing Table 3 demon1997). The other case was a take-nothing plaintiffs' judgment, in which the jury
found fault but no damages.
81 The sample consists of all available inmate civil rights cases terminated in fiscal
1993, with A 0 coding for a positive award for plaintiff or "both." Five cases are
omitted because the docket sheet did not include relevant information; thirteen
because no docket sheet could be obtained, and two because they were not inmate
cases at all.
82 According to their docket sheets, thirty-seven of the fifty-two cases in the first
row have awards between $1 and $499, which, according to one of the directions the
A 0 currently gives court personnel, should be coded with a zero award. For the
reasons explained above, supra note 59, we think these cases are best considered as
nonerrors, but we report them in this note for the sake of complete transparency. In
addition, awards on the breakpoint of rounding (for example, $1500) are not treated
as erroneous whichever way they are rounded (for example, coded as either "1" or
"2").
83 Some case entries reported in this row have errors of multiple types and are
therefore listed more than once.
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strates is a meta-point we want to emphasize: the A 0 data can vary a
great deal across case categories. Compared to tort cases, the errors
in inmate cases have a quite different feel. Rounding errors are rarely
present here, perhaps because the awards are lower (as the awards are
meant to be coded in thousands, there is less rounding to do). Instead, in this sample, a majority of errors are digit errors, which are
common. These are likely to have a large impact on the accuracy of
summary statistics from the A 0 data.
Table 2's total error rate of 41%, and Table 3's total error rate of
29%, each demonstrate that researchers' caution about errors in the
AO's award data is merited. The absolute rate of error is high. But
even a very high rate of error would not matter for most research purposes if errors are consistently small. And for some purposes, even
large errors would not pose an obstacle to using the A 0 data if those
errors were symmetrically distributed around zero (so that they would
tend to cancel each other out). Thus we next consider the magnitude
and distribution of errors.
One way to assess the size of an error is as a percentage of the
actual damage award. Using this approach for the torts sample, it
turns out that although errors are often small (6% or less of the actual
value for about a quarter of the errors), they are as often equal to
loo%, and nearly as often quite large (200% or more of the actual
value for about a fifth of the errors, and more than 1000% for onetenth of the errors). The median error amount is 81%. This may
overstate error magnitude, however: leaving out the anomalous cases
in which the award is coded as zero (for which the error amounts are,
of course, 100%)X4the median error among cases with errors is just
17%-quite small.
For assessment of error direction as well as magnitude, it's useful
to consider a simpler error index-the true amount minus the AOcoded amount. Using this error figure, at least in our torts sample,
errors again have a non-normal distribution, several aspects of which
are worth noting. First, small errors are the most prevalent. Among
these small errors there is a slight overrepresentation of negative errors-A0 understatement of true awards. However, there are a fairly
large number of very large errors, and these demonstrate substantial
overrepresentation of positive errors-A0
overstatement of true
awards. The 9999s and digit errors are the bulk but not all of these.
Thc inmate sample looks somewhat different. Using either error
index, about half the errors are quite small, but about half (the digit
84 For the reasons discussed inJ1.anote 88 and accompanying text, omitting these
cases seems unlikely to bias assessments of award amoilnts.
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errors, mostly) are very large. And nearly all the errors are overstatement of true awards.
All this is conceptually simple. A significant portion of the awards
seem to be erroneously coded; the 9999 code only rarely means what
it purports to and there are, depending on the case category, more or
fewer rounding, "digit," and other errors. In the torts sample, the
magnitude of errors tends to be small, but is often quite large, with
most large errors overstating actual damages. In the inmate sample,
nearly all of the errors overstate actual damages-half by a small
amount, half by a large amount. What is far harder is to assess how
much all this error matters for actual research uses, and whether there
are methods by which researchers might work around errors to obtain
useful information from the A 0 database. The next section moves to
this issue.

2. Research Implications of the A 0 Award Error Pattern
Researchers have tended to use the A 0 data on award amounts in
two distinct ways. Some users of the data-especially recent usershave been interested in modeling quite complex litigation dynamics.
Such researchers explore, for example, the prevalence of settlement,
and its relationship with other docket f e a t ~ r e s , ~ bthe
r impact of
demographic factors on award level~,~%r
the decision to appeal and
the outcome of the appellate process.87 For such uses, the devil may
well be in the details. That is, whether the degree of error in award
amounts undermines the A 0 data's ability to sustain this kind of research turns on the fine details of research design and model specification. All we can do here is offer a warning to such researchers to be
aware of the issue and design their studies accordingly.
85 See Fournier & Zuehlke, Out-ofcourt Settlements, supm note 8; Fournier &
Zuehlke, Litigalion and Settlement, supra note 8.
86 Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 5; Helland & Tabarrok, supm note 7.
87 See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, Dejindanls' Advantage, supm note 2; Clermont
& Eisenberg, Plainliphobin, s u p a note 2 . These two studies find that appellate courts
reviewing tried cases tend to be more favorable to defendants than to plaintiffs. Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobin, SU@(Lnote 2, at 952. Appellate courts are more
likely to reverse a trial victory for plaintiffs than for defendants. Id. But the studies
me individual case data for award amount9 and therefore could be affected by the
error patterns reported here. Re-running the analysis used in those studies with (1 )
9999 cases separately coded as such (award amounts in cases with awards of 9999 were
treated by using a dummy variable), and (2) exclusion of 9999 cases, yields no material difference in results. In the models that treat 9999 cases separately, such cases are
treated by using a dummy variable. The variable was not statistically significant in any
of the models.
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Other researchers use the A 0 data not for econometric modeling, but for the light shed on the political economy of particular
flavors of litigation. These scholars and policymakers seek, that is, to
understand the central tendencies of particular portions of the federal docket. The reliability problems reported above pose a more
manageable challenge to this kind of work-one on which we may be
able to make some progress in this Article. We next consider how
such researchers might work around the A 0 award errors to obtain
useful information from the A 0 database. To assess the overall impact
of the errors, Table 4 reports on the mean tort awards in our 2000 tort
sample, again as checked against dockets available from PACER; Table 5 looks at the distribution of awards, including the median; Tables
6 a n d 7 present the corresponding data from the inmate sample.
In comparing actual to AO-reported award levels, a preliminary
decision must be made about what to compare with what. For our
purposes, what seems most sensible is to compare the apparent universe of awards with the true universe of awards (rather than, as in
Tables 3 and 4, comparing the A 0 values of some given set of cases
with the PACER value of the same set of cases). More precisely, a
researcher using just A 0 data to compute mean awards by case category or time period, for example, would, we believe, most reasonably
proceed as follows: (1) limit the sample to cases in which a judgment
was, according to the A 0 data, entered for plaintiff or for both plaintiff and defendant, and (2) further limit the sample to those cases in
which the coded award for plaintiff exceeded zero. The second limitation is based on the reasonable assumption that awards of zero in
damage actions won by plaintiffs are rare-so that the zeros are either
erroneous, signify missing data, or mark the cases as injunctive or declaratory judgment cases rather than damage actions.88 To understand how much the error in the A 0 data matters, then, the most
88 Prior to our work here, it might have been thought reasonable for some purposes to include zero awards in the mean computation on the ground that they are
not known to be erroneous. Our work cautions strongly against this approach. Moreover, at least as far as our torts sample indicates, leaving out plaintiffs' victories with
AO-coded zero awards is unlikely to bias the result because, statistically comparing the
actual awards from the anomalous zero-award cases to those from the larger nonanomalous portion of the docket, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the cases
actually present observations from the same distribution. More specifically, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the medians of the two distributions are equal (the pvalue for a Mann-Whitney test is .55); one cannot reject the hypothesis that the overall
distributions are equivalent (the p-value of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is .81); and
one cannot reject the hypothesis that the means of log-transformed distributions are
equal (the p-value for a T-test is .44 assuming equal variances and .48 not assuming
equal variances).
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useful comparison is between the results of the above reasonably constituted set of awards and the true set, comprising all the damage actions in which plaintiffs are recorded in docket sheets as the victors,
regardless of the victor or the level of award noted in the A 0
database. This compares two slightly different sets of cases-but that
is because the purpose is not to check the reliability of individual data
points (an issue fully canvassed above) but rather to assess the impact
of the errors on assessments of the distributional tendencies of
awards. The tables following thus take this approach.
a. Tort Awards

95%
confidence
Mean intervals

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

True mean

A 0 mean, A 0 award > 0 (and true award found)
True mean of A 0 zero-awards
True mean of A 0 9999 awards
A 0 mean, A 0 award > 0, excluding 9999 cases
Replace only 9999 awards with true data

816
1387
618
4717
456
872

452-1180
1009-1765
129-1108
696-8738
317-595
453-1290

n

286
246
40
24
222
246

SOURCE:
ICPSR 8429, szpra note 1, supplemented by PACER docket research. The
first row shows the true mean award as determined by inspecting PACER dockets.
The second and fifth rows show mean A 0 award codes. The third and fourth rows
show true mean awards for cases for which the A 0 award code is "0" and "9999."
The final row combines true and A 0 awards, replacing A 0 codes only for A 0
awards coded 9999 and omitting A 0 awards coded zero.

Table 4's first row sets out what we refer to as the "true" mean
award in tried tort cases in the sample. That mean is based on the 286
docket sheets in our tort trial sample whose dockets show judgments
for plaintiffs, regardless of how the A 0 coded either the victor or the
amount of the judgment. (We have omitted the non-damages plaintiffs' judgments, discussed above, because including non-monetary
cases obscures the true award pattern in the damage actions.) The
row shows that the mean award for the full tort sample, as determined
by inspecting the docket sheets via PACER, is approximately $816,000,
with a 95% confidence interval of $452,000 to $1,180,000. In contrast,
the table's second row shows that the mean award that a researcher
looking only at the A 0 data (excluding AO-reported zero-awards)
would report for a similar case population would be $1,387,000. The
AO-based mean award is thus far higher than the more accurate mea-
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sure-the error is $571,000 on a base of $816,000, or 70%.89 Table
4's second numerical row also shows that the 95% confidence intervals for the two means overlap only ~lightly.~"
Because we are interested in the influence of both zero and 9999
awards on the AO-based mean, the table's next three rows explore
these topics. We know from Table 2 that half of the zero and even
more of the 9999 awards are erroneous. But how large is the resulting
error in the estimate of the mean? Table 4's third row shows that the
cases with zero judgments in which plaintiffs are coded as victors have
a mean award, as reported on the docket sheets, of $618,000; the
fourth row shows that the 9999 cases have a mean award, as reported
on the docket sheets, of approximately $4.7 million.
So, for researchers seeking to use the A 0 data in future analyses,
both the zero and the 9999 awards seem to pose significant problems.
One possible solution is simply to discard such awards. Table 4's fifth
row tries out this approach, and shows that if both the zero and 9999
awards are excluded, the mean award in the remaining part of the
sample is $456,000. Thus, comparing an AO-based estimate to the
true tort case mean of $816,000, the AO-based estimate shifts from
substantially too high with the 9999 cases included to substantially too
low if they (along with the zero cases) are omitted. The reason is
clear: the AO-based mean is substantially too large because the 9999
cases are not in fact on average awards of nearly $10 million or higher.
Yet the mean calculated by excluding the 9999 cases is too low because some of these cases' awards are correctly coded, and as a group
they are therefore atypically high compared to the non-9999 cases.
A second possible adjustment that continues to economize on
case-by-case research could employ detailed, docket-sheet-based, investigation only of the awards entered as 9999. Table 4's sixth row reports this calculation of the mean, based on replacing only the 9999
awards with the true award, as reported on docket sheets. That is, the
sixth row is based on 222 non-zero trial awards as reported in the A 0
89 The alternative approach, which (asjust stated, see supm note 88) we believe is
conceptually flawed, would bc to compute the AO-based mean reported in the second
row by including trials with zero awards. But this approach includes a fairly large
number of cases known to be non-monctary declaratoryjudgments, see supm note 80,
and an equal number of cases in which the zero-awards coded by the A 0 are known
to be incorrect. In any event, this approach yields a sample of 308 awards to use in
computing the AO-based mean, with a mean of $1.108 nlillion and a 95% confidence
inte~valof $800,000 to $1.415 million.
90 The difference between the means of the awards in the first two rows of Table
4 is highly statistically significantly (/I c 0.0001). The difference persists even after a
log transformation of award levels.
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database, and twenty-four trial awards based on case-by-case inspection
of cases whose awards are entered in the A 0 database as 9999. The
mean award using this methodology is $872,000, reasonably close to
the true tort-case mean of $816,000. On a percentage basis, the error
is $56,000 out of $816,000, or 6.9%. Table 4 also shows that the 95%
confidence intervals of the true mean and the 9999-replacementbased mean overlap nearly entirely. This second adjustment, then, is
much more satisfactory than the first: the coding errors in the 222
non-9999 cases are not so substantial as to yield a distorted mean
when the 9999 cases are corrected. Moreover, the basic analysis holds
in a second, smaller sample as well (although with a somewhat less
accurate estimate of the mean), so it seems to be quite robust, at least
for tort cases.Y1
Table 5 continues the analysis but instead of mean awards reports
percentiles, including the fiftieth percentile (the median). The initial
distortion introduced by unquestioning use of A 0 data is substantially
smaller than for the mean award. Table 5's first row shows the true
median award to be $137,000. The second row shows the AO-based
median to be $151,000, an error of $14,000 or 10.2% (of $137,000),
compared to the 70% error in the AO-based mean. The error is in
the expected direction-the A 0 data exceed the true median. Here,
even without correction, aggregate statements about the A 0 data
could be useful. The AO-based median is the right order of magnitude; $151,000 does not "feel" dramatically different from $137,000and is, in fact, within the 95% confidence interval of the true amount.
A policy maker who acted on the basis of the A 0 figure for a general
sense of award levels would not be too far off for many purpose^.^^
The effect of excluding the twenty-four 9999 awards is helpful,
though less so than in the case of the mean. Table 5's third row
91 Indeed, as to each point reported above, our results are similar in the second
torts sample described previously. See szrpra note 78. The AO-based mean, $1.855
niillion ( n = 127), was very high compared to the true mean, observed by inspecting
the docket sheets, which was $799,000 ( n = l36),with this sinaller sample's seventeen
9999 cases left in. The AO-based mean was very low-$430,000 ( n = 206) with the
9999 cases taken out-but approaching acceptable-$600,000 ( n = 126) with docketbased corrections to the 9999 cases that could be found. The error rate of 24.5%
from the true mean is substantially larger than the error achieved in the 2000 cases,
but still supplies a more reasonable estimate of the mean award than do alternative
methods. The higher error rate may be due to the ordinary random variation in the
much smaller sample of cases, or to some nonrandom factor such as the small sample
of districts.
92 The 1996-1999 tort data, see supra note 78, confirm this general analysis. In
that second tort sample, the AO-based median award is $186,000; the true median
award is $134,000.

1482

NOTKE D A M E LAW K E V I E W

[VOL.

78:5

shows that excluding the twenty-four cases yields a median estimate of
$125,000. The error is now $12,000 out of $137,000, a bit smaller
than the error resulting from using the AO-based median, and, again,
well within the 95% confidence interval of the true median award.

SOURCE:
ICPSK 8429, supra note I , supplemented by PACER docket research 

Shaded squares best fit with row 1's true data. 


Obviously, the AO-based median in row 2 is too high because
only some of the 9999 cases are in fact awards in excess of $9 million.
The twenty-four cases coded as 9999 in our sample actually have a
median award of $998,000-substantially higher than the $125,000
median of the non-9999 cases, but not nearly so high as the coded
9999 figure suggests. The cases' relatively large awards also explain
why Table 5's third row estimate-based on excluding only the 9999
cases-is too low. Excluding such cases eliminates a set of observations that are high relative. to the mass of cases, thereby artificially
depressing the median derived from the non-excluded cases.
Replacing only the 9999 awards with the true awards in such cases
yields improvement for the median estimate. Table 5's fourth (and
final) row shows that replacing only the 9999 awards produces a median of $144,000. This is $7000 above the true median of $137,000, an
error of 5.1%. This is yet more accurate than the 8.8% error obtained
by excluding the 9999 cases. Indeed, across all percentiles, replacing
the 9999 awards with their actual values gets the closest to the true
distribution of awards; each box in the row is therefore shaded grey.
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Both the point estimates and the confidence intervals in this row,
across all five percentiles, are reasonable.
But even though these best estimates depend on case-by-case inspection of a number of dockets, the third row, which simply leaves
out the 9999 cases, yields confidence intervals and point estimates that
are quite reasonable for the tenth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventyfifth percentiles. They are low only for the ninetieth percentile. Indeed, even the second row, which includes the 9999 cases, is fairly
reasonable up to the median point. This suggests that researchers may
be able to obtain a reasonable estimate of the median award without
any docket-research. If one is interested in an upper-limit estimate,
one could simply use the AO-based median (as in row 2) and be reasonably confident that the estimate is conservative (in the sense that
the true median is unlikely to be substantially higher than the number
so reported). So, for example, if one wishes to report an upper limit
on the median tort awards in federal court for a year or other time
period, the AO-based median seems reasonable to use. Similarly, if
one is interested in a lower-limit estimate, excluding the 9999 cases, as
in row 3, gives a reasonable figure. The excluded 9999 awards tend to
drive up the median, as they do the mean. So in our sample, the
$125,000 figure is a reasonable lower-bound point estimate of the median award.
b.

Inmate Awards

Table 6 reports on the mean awards in our 1993 inmate sample,
again as checked against dockets available from PACER. Table 6's
first row shows that the true mean for the inmate cases is $69,000.
The A 0 data, used as published, yield a mean of $927,000." While
the $858,000 error in the mean is bigger in absolute amount than the
mean error for our tort sample, the more relevant and more damning
statistic is that the error in the inmate case sample amounts to well
over 1000% (the analogous figure for the tort sample was 70%).94

93 There is one outlier award of over $6 million, correctly coded in the A 0 data
set; if that award is taken out, the txue mean is only $1 6,403; the A 0 mean also comes
down to $882,000. So, if anything, the text understates the degree of error.
94 See supra note 88, and accompanying text.
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95 %
confidence
Amount intervals n
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

True mean
A 0 mean

True mean of A 0 9999 awards
A0 mean, excluding 9999 awards
Replace only A 0 9999 awards with true mean
A 0 mean, excluding 9999 awards mzd
adjust digit errors

69
927
23
540
518
199

-35-174
495-1360
8-38
257-822
247-789
35-364

122
122
5
117
122
117

Sounc~::ICPSR 8429, supm note 1 , supplemented by PACER docket research. The first row
sho\vs the true meat1 arvarcl as determined by inspecting PACER tlockets. The second and
fourth rows show mean A 0 ;\ward codes. The third row slrorvs true rnean awards for cases for
which the A 0 awarcl code is "9999." T l ~ ef0urt.h rorv coml,ines true and A 0 awards, replacing
A 0 cotles for A 0 ;nvards coded 9999. The final row excludes all awards coded 9999 and
;tc!justs all cligit errors.

One hypothesis about the source of this large error is that inmate
civil rights cases have an exceptionally high percentage of awards reported as 9999. This proves incorrect, however. As Table 6 shows,
reported 9999 awards are just five of 122 cases (4.1%) with awards
greater than zero in the 1993 ininate sample, compared to twenty-four
of 246 (9.8%) in the analogous torts sample in Table 4. Moreover, in
the full A 0 trial data set since 1991, which is described in Table 10
below, awards coded 9999 account for only 2.5% of the inmate
However, even though 9999 awards are not exceptionally frequent, the lower, true awards in inmate cases must be substantially
more distorted by these erroneous large awards than are the larger
awards in tort cases. Table 6's fifth row suggests that replacing the
9999 awards with their actual values from docket sheets does go some
portion of the way towards estiinating the true mean, though by no
means far enough for most purposes. Replacing the five 9999 awards
yields a mean estimate of $518,000, quite a bit closer to the real mean
award of $69,000, though still dramatically higher.
Table 6's final row demonstrates that there is another, even
larger source of error-digit mistakes, which typically overstate awards
by a factor of 1000 (when, say, a judgment of $112 is entered as 112,
which is supposed LO mean $112,000). To obtain the statistics in the
95 The diffet-cnce in 9999-awarcl rates between 1 9 9 3 let-minations and the A 0
data set as a whole is not statistically significant.
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last row, we took each case in the inmate sample that had a digit error,
and substituted the correct code for the award; we also excluded the
9999 award cases." The result is a much better estimate of the true
mean though still substantially incorrect. In sum, it seems likely that
the real prevalence of small awards in the inmate sample not only
amplifies the effect of the erroneous 9999 award entries but, more
importantly, has a strong tendency to promote digit errors. (It makes
intuitive sense that awards under $1000 are the most easily miscoded,
because they do not have more digits than there are spaces in the data
system.)
The problem is that the correction in the final line of Table 6
relies on the cumbersome process of reading many dockets, which is
quite impracticable in many circumstances. So we move on to Table
7, which examines the distribution of awards in the inmate sample, to
see whether some other technique may be helpful in gleaning from
the A 0 data a more accurate picture of the awards.
Table 7 demonstrates that for the inmate cases, the very issue that
introduces error-the extremely modest awards-also makes that error matter less, if one is looking at and below the fiftieth percentile.
The true median (in row 1) is just $950 (the tenth and twenty-fifth
percentiles are smaller-so if they were rounded up, to match the A 0
data's capabilities, they would be accurate). Using the medians in the
next three rows in the table certainly does not eliminate the error,
which is $4000 or about 400% if the comparison is to the A 0 data in
its entirety (row 2) and $2000 or about 200% if the comparison drops
the five 9999 awards (row 3). On the other hand, the importance of
the error's magnitude depends on the research question being asked.
It seems likely that $5000 or $3000 could be used almost interchangeably with $950 in many discussions of inmate award issues. Indeed,
the latter figure is not far off from the 95% confidence interval for the
true number. A policymaker who acted on the basis of the A 0 figures
for a general sense of award levels would not be far off. And the AObased median would again provide a conservative upper bound estimate on the median inmate award.
Thus, as in the case of the tort data, researchers, without the need
for case-by-case inspection, can obtain a reasonable estimate of the
median award. If one is interested in an upper-limit estimate, one
could simply use the AO-based median and be reasonably confident
that the estimate is conservative in the sense that the true median is
96 If' only the digit errors are adjusted, and the 9999 cases remain in the sample,
the resulting mean is 493, with a confidence i n t e n d between 124 and 862. This
alone is a more significant improvement than simply exclitding the 9999 cases.
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1. True data
( n = 122)

2. A0 data: all (true
award found)
( 77, = 122)
3. A 0 data,
excluding 9999
cases ( n = 117)
4. Replace only 9999
awards with true
data ( n = 122)
5. Adjust digit errors
in A0 data
( n = 122)
6. Exclude A 0 9999
awards and adjust
digit errors
( n = 117)
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95% confidence intervals, by percentile
(point estimates)
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th
5-23
27-102
.001-.02 .025-.3 .5-2.5
(0.001) (0.10) (.95)
(10)
(47)

(1)

(1)

(1)

(12)

(101)

SOUKC:E:
ICPSK 8429, supm note 1, supplemented by PACEK docket research.
Shaded squares best tit with row 1's tnie data.

unlikely to be higher than the $5000 so reported. Above the fiftieth
percentile, however, the erroneous awards entirely dominate the sample, and the A 0 data cannot itself do much to inform an estimate.
For that, once again, researchers would need to read dockets.
But how is one to know whether a given component of the A 0
data is more like our torts sample, or more like our inmate case sample, or unlike either? Again, the A 0 data itself may help to answer
this question. We suggest above that the feature of the inmate cases
that makes them error-prone is the low level of awards. Even though
the A 0 data inflate the awards, they report a very large number of
awards of "1": 52 of 122 (43%). This might be a potential tip-off in
other case categories as well. We explore this issue briefly in Table 10,
at the end of this Article; it turns out that there is no other category
even close to inmate cases on this measure.
3. Estimating Employment Discrimination Awards
This section uses the information about award errors in the preceding sections to estimate the level of awards in federal employment
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discrimination trials. The sample consists of all tried federal employment discrimination cases terminated from 1994 through 2000.Y7We
wish to estimate the true award levels in such cases without using the
labor-intensive technique, employed above, of inspecting individual
case docket sheets. To do so, we use, without modification, the AOreported awards in all cases other than those in which the entry in the
"amount" field is suspect because it is "9999." For those cases reporting a 9999 award, we used PACER to inspect the actual docket sheets.
Table 8 reports the results.

I
1.
2.
3.
4.

A 0 data ( n o adjustment)
A 0 data (excluding 9999 awards)
Replace only A 0 9999 awards
T r u e awards, 9999 cases only

Estimated
mean

Estimated
median

n

863
295
301
410

121
107
110
170

1298
1220
1292
70

SOURCE:
ICPSR 8429, supm note 1 (supplemented by PACER docket research of
cases with 9999 awards). Each row shows the estimated mean and median trial
award for the indicated data set.

Table 8's first row shows the A 0 data's mean and median employment discrimination awards-$863,000 and $121,000, respectively.
Our analysis of tort awards suggests that the mean is likely substantially too high because it includes many awards reported to be $9.999
million or higher that are in fact not so high. The second row of
Table 8 reports what we expect to be low estimates of both mean and
median, based on simply excluding the 9999 cases. Both figures turn
out to be close to those computed in the third row, which is based on
substituting the amount reported on the docket sheets for the seventy
available cases with A 0 award codes of 9999. In this sample, simply
excluding the 9999 cases yields mean and median estimates, $295,000
and $107,000, that are not too different from those we obtained by
97 More precisely, the sample is every case terminated between January 1, 1994
and September 30, 2000, with an A 0 case code of 442, in which the procedural progressis coded as after jury or judge trial and judgment is coded for plaintiff or for
"both" plaintiff and defendant.
98 Adjustments for inflation are based on BUREAU
OF LABORSTATISTICS,
U.S.
DEP'YI..
OF LABOR,
CONSUMER
PRICEINDEX,
ALLURBAN
CONSUMEKS
(2003), available nt
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.t (last visited Mar. 22, 2003). The
true values of some 9999 cases are not available so the total number of A 0 cases in the
table (1298) exceeds the sum of the number of 9999 cases and non-9999 cases.
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the more laborious method of looking up the results in the seventy
9999 cases, $301,000 and $110,000 (Of course, we cannot ascertain
the true mean or median without inspecting all of the non-9999 cases,
which we have not done.) Thus, in estimating the employment discrimination award mean, the technique of excluding the 9999 awards
may itself yield a reasonable estimate. No case-by-case inspection of
docket sheets may be required at all.
Why are the 9999-excluded mean and the 9999-ascertained mean
so much more similar in employment cases than in Table 4's tort cases
or in Table 6's inmate cases? Two hypotheses are worth noting. First,
the 9999 cases are a much smaller fraction of employment cases than
of tort cases or inmate cases. Seventy of 1298 employment case awards
(5.3%) have 9999 entered for the amount field. In Table 4's tort
awards, the 9999 cases comprise twenty-four of 246 cases (9.8%). This
difference is highly statistically significant ( p < .001). Second, the absolute level of docket-verified awards in the seventy 9999 employment
discrimination cases is noticeably smaller than the level of docket-verified awards in the twenty-four 9999 tort cases. In our torts sample,
about a quarter of the 9999 cases are accurately coded (that is, had
actual awards of $9.999 million or higher); taken together, the torts
9999 cases have a docket-verified mean of $4,717,000-more than ten
times the award level in non-9999 cases, reported in Table 4 to be
$456,000. In the employment sample, by contrast, just one (1.3%) of
the 9999 cases was accurately coded, and taken together, the 9999
cases have a docket-verified mean of just $410,000 compared to the
A 0 level of $295,000 for the non-9999 cases. Similarly, whereas the
docket-verified median for our tort 9999 cases is nearly eight times
greater than the docket-verified median for non-9999 cases, the true
median of employment 9999 cases, $170,000, is just $63,000, or
59.9%, above the non-9999 case median, as reported in the A 0 data.
Thus the tort 9999 cases are a higher percentage of all cases, and
they tend to have more extreme values than the employment discrimination 9999 cases. The result: our finding above that exclusion of the
tort 9999 cases more substantially affects both the mean and the median than does exclusion of employment discritnination 9999 cases.

The implications of our findings depend in part on whether researchers are interested in assessing win rates or award levels. We
briefly explore both below, and then apply the techliiques developed
here to estimate median trial awards for all large federal case
categories.
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Implications for Win-Rate Studies

Generally-that is, where no other anornaly exists to counsel caution-analyses using the AO's coding of which party obtained judgment are likely largely unaffected by errors in the A 0 data. Our
evidence suggests that when the A 0 data show that judgment is entered for plaintiff or defendant (at least in cases coded with non-zeroawards) the reported victor is overwhelmingly accurate. In tried cases,
moreover, relatively small fractions of the A 0 data report judgment
codes other than for plaintiff or defendant. Still, for groups of cases
that show substantial percentages of cases coded as judgment for both
parties, such as our inmate case category, researchers should consider
analyzing their data in the alternative: first without such cases and,
second, with such cases treated as victories for plaintiffs. If the results
of these alternative analyses are consistent with respect to the research
question of interest, little basis for concern exists about possible inaccuracies in the judgment coding. If the results are not consistent, further consideration of how to deal with the ambiguous judgment code
is necessary. In addition, as panel B-2 of Table 1 demonstrates, an
anomaly, such as the miscoding of which party obtained judgment in
cases coded with zero-awards, can render the "judgment for" data
quite inaccurate, and needs to be accounted for with care.

B.

Implications for Sludies of Amounts

With respect to award levels, our findings suggest that relying on
unmodified A 0 trial data substantially overstates mean awards. Tables
4 and 6 establish this in the areas of tort and inmate cases. And Table
8 suggests that this is the case in employment discrimination cases;
checking just the cases with coded awards of 9999 establishes that the
mean award derived from A 0 data is unreliable.
Tables 5 and 7, however, suggest that relying on the A 0 data to
study median awards is often reasonable, depending on the research
question being addressed. And Table 8's check on employment data
does not falsify this hypothesis. For tort cases, and perhaps for employment discrimination cases, the error in using A 0 data seems to be
within acceptable ranges for most purposes, and the error can be further reduced by the simple expedient of excluding awards coded as
9999. For inmate cases, and presumably for other classes of cases with
typically small awards, the percentage error in the median is high.
But the absolute difference in dollars between the AO-based median
and the true median is small, precisely because most awards are small.
For studies that use award amounts in a more complex way - not
looking at awards by case category, but rather performing more indi-
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vidualized modeling or other analysis-we offer only a cautionary
word. Whether the A 0 data are sufficiently reliable to support such
research will depend on the precise details of the research design, and
the issue requires close attention.

C. 	 Applications: Judgmen,t Patterns and Awards Patterns for A11
Federal Case Categom'es
We build on the results reported above to supply some possibly
helpful information about the A 0 data for several case categories. We
first report on the percentage of trials that the A 0 reports as ending
in judgments for plaintiffs or both plaintiffs and defendants, but with
zero-awards. This class of cases was especially troublesome for the inmate civil rights class of cases, but much less troublesome for tort
cases. We then supply an estimate of the median trial award for all
sizeable case categories.

1. Judgment Code Patterns
We have suggested that the successful use of A 0 data depends on
close attention to anomalies. In both torts and inmate civil rights litigation, purported plaintiffs' judgments with zero damages are anomalous. Table 9 presents data on this cautionary signal in other case
categories, as well as on the size of the category of judgment for
"both." The table shows the total number of trial outcomes, and the
percentage of those outcomes ending in judgments entered in the A 0
data as being for plaintiff or for both plaintiff and defendant. It is
limited to those case categories with at least one hundred trials coded
with judgments for plaintiff or "both" for years 1991-2000. The last
column explores the percentage of the plaintiffs' judgments in which
the damage award coded is zero. We exclude cases in which the A 0
data's "nature of judgment" code indicates that the judgment is an
injunction, a forfeiture or condemnation, a costs-onlyjudgment, and
so on, in contrast to a monetary judgment." That is, we intend the
column to explore a possible data anomaly, not an ordinary non-monetary judgment.100 (Of course, for some of these case categories,
99 lCPSR 8429, supm note 1.
100 Four "nature of judgment" codes remain: "-8," which codes missing information, "0," which codes "no monetary award," "I ," which codes "monetary award only,"
and "2,"which codes "monetary award and other." In every case category, all or
nearly all of cases that contribute to the potential anomaly we are highlighting-judgment for plaintiff or both combined with a zero award-have a nature of,judgment
code of zero ("no monetary award"). This is the code typically used in conjunction
with a defendant's victory. Since we know from our torts sample that many of the
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plaintiffs' judgments with zero damages might be expected, rather
than anomalous.)

Case category
Insurance (110)
Marine (120)
Miller Act (130)
Negotiable Instruments (140)
General Contract (190)
Contract Product Liability (195)
Land Condemnation (210)
Foreclosure (220)
Torts to Land (240)
Other Real Property (290)
Airplane (310)
Assault, Libel, Slander (320)
Federal Employers' Liab. (330)
Marine (340)
Motor Vehicle (350)
Motor Vehicle Product Liab. (355)
Other Personal Injury (360)
Medical Malpractice (362)
Product Liability (365)
Asbestos (368)
Fraud (370)
Other Personal Prop. Damage (380)
Property Damage Prod. Liab. (385)
Antitrust (410)
Bankruptcy Appeals (422)
Bankruptcy Withdrawal (423)
Other Civil Rights (440)
Voting (441 )
Employment Discrim. (442)
Accommodations (443)
RICO (470)
Habeas Corpus (530)
Inmate Civil Rights (550, 555)
Drug-Related Prop. Forfeiture (625)
Other Forfeiture & Penalty (690)

n
2265
533
217
307
4661
107
323
126
153
253
215
275
670
1124
2678
279
4675
1153
1713
307
379
477
198
180
178
142
6179
112
8200
272
185
338
7261
21 1
217

Judgment Judgment
for
for
plaintiffs
"both"

49%
63%
70%
63%
58%
54%
39%
72%
46%
53%
57%
40%
67%
53%
62%
28%
42%
33%
29%
82%
56%
55%
37%
47%
28%
39%
28%
40%
32%
44%
57%
18%
9%
78%
72%

4%
5%
10%
5%
8%
7%
11%
7%
5%
6%
1%
5%
1%
5%
2%
1%
2%
1%
2%
1%
6%
7%
4%
3%
10%
6%
4%
7%
3%
7%
8%
2%
3%
4%
4%

A 0 

award = 0, 

as % of 

victories for 

plain'tiff or 

"both" 


25%
15%
10%
10%
14%
5%
23%
24%
19%
41 %
7%
12%
6%
9%
7%
12%
10%
10%
12%
6%
12%
10%
12%
16%
81 %
16%
17%
84%
14%
22%
11%
90%
24%
63%
67%

cases with the anomalous 'tjudgment for plaintiff' (or both) and zero-award combination are, nonetheless, actually plaintiffs' judgments with erroneous award codes, we
conclude that, unforti~nately,the nature ofjuclgment code is unhelpful to our analysis here.
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TABLE
9 , CONTINUED

Case category
Fair L.abor Standards Act (710)
Labor/Mgt Relations (720)
Other Labor Litigation (790)
ERISA (791)
Copyright (820)
Patent (830)
Trademark (840)
Securities, Commodities, Exch. (850)
Tax Sui& (870)
Other Statutory Actions (890)
Environmental Matters (893)

n

Judgment Judgment
for
for
plaintiffs
"both"

A0
award = 0,
as % of
victories for
plaintiff or
"both"

588
235
378
1077
342
700
434
323
581
1135
200

53%
5%
13%
49%
29 %
3%
39%
3%
19%
45%
5%
21%
68%
17%
7%
9%
54%
34%
61%
9%
33%
53%
8%
17%
51%
6%
27%
49%
6%
30%
56%
28%
11%
SOURCE:
ICPSK 8429, sufim note 1. The table includes all cases coded in the A 0
data as terminating after trial with a judgment for plaintiff or defendant or both
plaintiff and defendant. It excludes cases with judgments coded as missing; and
cases coded as in-junctions, costs-only awards, and the like.

Table 9 demonstrates that cases with plaintiffs' victories combined with awards coded as zero are most prominent in a few categories, many of them cases of a type that rarely result in damages (for
example, land condemnation, foreclosure, and habeas corpus). In
these categories, the coillbination is not anomalous at all. In other
categories, however, a high portion of such cases may well be a signal
of erroneous coding. Unless our inmate case sample turns out
(against our current belief) to be nonrepresentative of inmate cases,
we know that a researcher who accepts the "judgment for" code at
face value would overstate plaintiffs' success rate in that category. The
same may be true for other case categories in which damage actions
are prevalent, and nontrivial percentages of zero awards exist. Based,
however, on the evidence from our torts sample, which seems likely to
be more typical of the dataset as a whole, we suspect that in case categories in which plaintiffs are more frequently successful, errors signaled by an anomalous zero-award will be found more often in the
award coding than in the "judgment for" code.
Table 9 also suggests that the influence ofjudgments entered as
for "both" plaintiff and defendant varies by case category. Table 1
shows such judgments as nearly always for plaintiffs. But Tables 1 and
9 both indicate that the "both" code is a much higher fraction of possible pro-plaintiff judgment codes in inmate civil rights cases than it is
in other case categories-indeed, using Table 9's figures, "both" judgments constitute nearly a third of the total pro-plaintiff jodgrnen.ts for
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the inmate case category, a rate that is nearly the highest in any sizeable case category. So, the systematic coding of some plaintiff wins as
wins for both has a larger effect on accurately stating plaintiff win
rates in inmate civil rights cases than in most classes of cases.
2. Median Award Estimates and Rates of Suspicious Award Codes
Given the general reasonableness of the median estimates in our
two sampled case categories, we apply the foregoing analysis to a
larger set of A 0 cases to provide interested researchers and policymakers with likely-improved estimates of median awards across many
case categories. Table 10's rows represent each A 0 case category
(and its respective code value) for which at least fifty trials with judgments for plaintiffs were concluded with positive awards from fiscal
years 1991 through 2000.10' The first numerical column in each row
reports the median dollar award, in inflation-adjusted year 2000 dollars, as computed from the unaltered A 0 data. The second numerical
column reports the number of verdicts used to compute that median
award. The third numerical row adjusts the A 0 median by recomputing the median after excluding awards of 9999. The fourth numerical
column shows the number of verdicts used in computing this adjusted
median award. The fifth numerical column, computed from the second and fourth columns, shows the percent of verdicts for each case
category that report an award of 9999. And the sixth numerical column shows the percent of verdicts for each case category in which the
award is coded "1." These low-award cases could be of special interest
as a source of error because where awards in the hundreds and low
101 More precisely, the sample consists of terminations in which the judgment was
after a jury or judge trial that resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff with a positive
award noted. Dollar amounts are adjusted using Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation
data. See supra note 98. Table 1's finding that cases coded by the A 0 as judgment for
"both" plaintiff and defendant are actually plaintiff victories suggests checking Table
10's median results by including 'tjudgment for both" cases. We have done so and, in
the large majority of case categories, including the "judgment for both" cases does not
materially change the median. Table 30 excludes such cases because we do not assume that Table 1's pattern holds for every category. Moreover, including the "judgment for both" cases seems to us most suspect in case categories in which including
them generates a large change in the medians. In these categories, the 'tjudgment for
both" cases are most dissimilar in amounts from cases coded as plaintiff judgment?,
the proportion of "judgment for both" cases is especially high, or both the amounts
and proportion are unusual. Either of these features may indicate, for a particular
case code, that cases coded as "judgment for both" differ systematically from plaintiffs' victories: perhaps they err by more than simply incorrectly coding which party
won, or perhaps they constitute a conceptually separate category of outcomes in some
other way.
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thousands are particularly prevalent, what we have called "digit error"
is likely to abound. Kesearchers would do well to be particularly careful if their focus is on a case category with a high proportion of reported small awards.
For example, using the A 0 data without modification, the product liability case category (code 365) shows a median award of
$486,000 based on 437 plaintiffs' verdicts. Excluding the 9999 awards
yields a median products award of $368,000 based on 385 verdicts.
We now hypothesize that the $368,000 figure is closer to the true median than is the $486,000 figure."'"
The principal non-inmate civil rights categories, "Other Civil
Rights" (code 440) and "Employment Discrimination" (code 442),
have adjusted median awards of $78,000 and $116,000 respectively.
Inmate civil rights cases, for which the A 0 data may be the least accurate (as a percentage of the true award), conform to the pattern of
low awards suggested in Part 11's detailed analysis of 1993 inmate
cases. The $6000 median estimate in Table 10 is probably too high in
light of that discussion.
Inmate civil rights cases also have by far the largest percentage of
trials entered resulting in damages coded as "1" in the A 0 data. The
39% rate is more than triple the rate in most categories. This high
rate of such awards is consistent with Table 3's report that, in our
inmate case sample, fifty-two of 122 awards (42.6%) are coded as "1."
The many low-award cases in this much larger sample further support
the suggestion that the impact of the error pattern in inmate civil
rights cases is likely not typical of the impact of the error pattern in
other classes of cases.
One interesting implication of Table 10 is that even after deflation of awards by omission of the 9999 cases, the reported awards remain substantially higher than awards in state court litigation.lo3

102 Given interest in the size of awards, one noteworthy feature of Table 10 is that
only three case categories, Asbestos, Antitrust, and Patent, have median awards
greater than $1 n~illion,even using the probably inflated medians based on all the A 0
awarcls, including the 9999 cases. The Antitrust and Patent categories have the highest percentage of 9999 awarcls; these 9999 awards may, indeed, be more-than-typically
accluate in these large-award ca~egories.The 9999 cases are not, however, contributing much to the high award level for asbestos cases, which are a world unto the~nselves. .See, e.6, Deborah R. Hensler, As 7i'~neGoes 1Iy: Asbestos Litigation AJer Amchem
nnrl Ortiz, 80 TEX.L. REV. 1899 (2002).
103 Kg., Eisenberg et al., suj~rnnote 55, at 439.
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Plaintiffs'
verdicts with
non-zero
judgment
Case categoly
Insurance (110)
Marine (120)
Miller Act (130)
Negotiable Instruments (140)
General Contract (190)
Contract Product Liability (195)
Torts to Land (240)
Other Real Property Actions (290)
Airplane (310)
Assault, Libel, Slander (320)
Federal Employers' Liab. (330)
Marine (340)
Motor Vehicle (350)
Motor Vehicle Prod. Liab. (355)
Other Personal Injury (360)
Medical Malpractice (362)
Product Liability (365)
Asbestos (368)
Fraud (370)
Other Pers. Prop. Damage (380)
Prop. Da~nageProd. Liab. (385)
Antitrust (410)
Other Civil Rights (440)
Employment Discrim. (442)
Accommodations (443)
RICO (470)
Inmate Civil Rights (550, 555)
Fair Labor Standards Act (710)
Labor/Mgt Relations (720)
Other Labor Litigation (790)
ERISA (791)
Copyright (820)
Patent (830)
Trademark (840)
Sec., Comm., Exchange (850)
Tax Suits (870)
Other Statutory Actions (890)
Environmental Matters (893)

Excluding
A 0 9999
awards

% A 0 award

=

Median
(1000s)

n

Median
(1000s)

n

9999

1

173
107
48
366
238
327
161
98
681
103
233
187
113
652
109
482
486
3799
355
169
284
2823
99
129
40
631
5
47
198
111
60
62
1694
172
547
133
77
607

769
282
135
173
2261
54
61
68
114
99
410
543
1509
68
1734
337
437
238
186
230
62
65
1362
2186
91
94
479
260
75
114
364
187
250
139
130
198
369
76

149
97
42
309
201
156
148
76
483
90
198
165
95
431
90
364
368
3793
242
144
225
1190
78
116
35
422
5
46
178
91
53
59
625
134
357
108
62
524

715
272
128
155
2066
47
59
63
103
91
387
513
1418
58
1619
297
385
236
163
208
57
44
1262
2064
86
79
467
255
72
104
350
180
194
129
118
183
338
70

7.0%
3.5%
5.2%
10.4%
8.6%
13.0%
3.3%
7.4%
9.6%
8.1%
5.6%
5.5%
6.0%
14.7%
6.6%
11.9%
11.9%
0.8%
12.4%
9.6%
8.1%
32.3%
7.3%
5.6%
5.5%
16.0%
2.5%
1.9%
4.0%
8.8%
3.8%
3.7%
22.4%
7.2%
9.2%
7.6%
8.4%
7.9%

1.7%
1.8%
0.7%
1.7%
1.5%
0.02%
4.9%
2.9%
2.6%
4.0%
1.2%
1.5%
2.1%
1.5%
2.5%
0.9%
0.5%
0.0%
2.2%
3.9%
3.2%
0.0%
6.5%
1.7%
4.4%
0.0%
39.0%
5.8%
2.7%
4.4%
4.4%
5.9%
2.8%
4.3%
0.8%
6.6%
5.1%
1.3%

SOURCE:
ICPSR 8429, supra note 1. The table includes all cases coded in the A 0 data as
terminating with a judgment for plaintiff and a positive award amount in following a
trial.
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Subject to the limitations of our samples, we tentatively conclude
that A 0 data can provide reasonably accurate estimates of the proportion of cases in which plaintiffs win damages judgments. A possible
systematic understatement of plaintiff win rates exists that is attributable to judgments recorded as judgments for "both" plaintiffs and defendants in fact tending to favor plaintiffs, but this outcome
classification accounts for a small percentage of trial outcomes.
With respect to awards, it is necessary to distinguish between
mean and median awards. The error resulting from using unmodified A 0 data to compute mean awards has a distinct direction in our
A 0 data systematically overestimate the mean
two samples-the
award. Thus, studies that rely on A 0 data to address questions about
the level of awards probably overstate amounts paid out in, for example, products liability litigati~n."'~
For case categories with fairly large
awards, substantially improved mean-award estimates are likely obtainable by substituting awards recorded on docket sheets for awards
coded by the A 0 data as 9999. Estimates of median awards based on
the A 0 data without further investigation appear to be of reasonable
size and to provide useful upper bounds of true median awards.
The A 0 database is likely to remain one of the major sources for
civil justice research. We hope that this partial exploration of the accuracy of the data is helpful to other researchers, offering not only
warnings but reasonably efficient solutions to identified accuracy
problems.

104 Eisenberg & Henderson, suprr~note 16, at '739.

